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Abstract
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This brief country case study on Turkey aims to 
summarize the fundamental developments in the banking 
sector, which represents almost 90 percent of the financial 
sector in the country. The brief has two parts. The first 
covers the 2001 financial crisis and the developments 
until end of 2007, the year before the global financial 
crisis of 2008 started. The second part focuses on the 
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macro-prudential policies applied by the Central Bank of 
the Republic of Turkey in response to the global financial 
crisis in three phases: (i) full liquidity support after 
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strategy (April 2010), and (iii) the new policy mix (final 
quarter of 2010). 
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The Experience with Macro-Prudential Policies of the Central Bank of the Republic of  
Turkey in Response to the Global Financial Crisis
1 
 
The 2001 Financial Crisis and the Period until the End of 2007 
The developments in the Turkish economy and banking sector after 2001 are so striking 
that the year 2001 is widely accepted as a structural break point for the country. The pre-2002 
period in Turkey had a poor macroeconomic environment, an ineffective financial supervision 
framework divided between different institutions,
2 and sector-specific problems in banking, such 
as the moral hazard issue due to savings deposit insurance schemes, which, taken together, led to 
a significant economic crisis in a negative global sentiment.  
During the 1990s, the banking sector in Turkey had been dominated by inefficient public 
banks, and the sector had serious deficiencies, such as high risks in foreign currency, interest 
rates, and liquidity. The sector was deficient in good governance principles, and the economic 
environment surrounding the banks was unhealthy. The inflation rate was at very high two -digit 
levels; even triple digit figures were observed, complicating the decision-making mechanisms of 
economic agents. The ratio of the central government budget deficit to gross domestic  product 
(GDP) was in a rising trend during the decade before the financial crisis, reaching 11.9 percent as 
of  the  end  of  2001.  In  such  an  environment,  economic  growth  rates,  already  low,  were 
unsustainable. The average annual real GDP growth rate between 1990  and 2001 was only 2.5 
percent. 
The high deficits of the public sector and the high real interest rates on public debt 
became a pull factor for the banking sector to finance these deficits. The banks thus left their 
main role of intermediation aside before the crisis. The credits-to-total assets ratio declined from 
47 percent to 32.8 percent between 1990 and 2000. Similarly, the credits -to-deposits ratio 
declined from 84 percent to 51 percent in the same period. The very high interest rate differential 
between Turkey and advanced economies also encouraged banks to take excessive exchange-rate 
risks by obtaining foreign currency funds from abroad and investing in high-yielding Turkish lira 
assets while also accumulating interest rate and liquidity risks. 
In addition to the problems in the macroeconomic environment, there were problems 
stemming from the banks’ governance practices and the political environment surrounding them. 
High operational losses of public banks were one of the distorting factors in the 1990s. The 
inefficient and unprofitable ways these banks were used led to significant ―duty losses‖ and these 
banks had to rely excessively on overnight borrowing, putting an upward pressure on overnight 
                                                 
1 This is a background paper to a forthcoming World Bank report titled ―Golden Growth: Restoring the Lustre of the 
European Economic Model.‖ The views expressed in this article are exclusively those of the authors and do not 
necessarily represent the views of the (i) Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey or its management, (ii) World Bank 
and  its  affiliated  organizations,  or  (iii)  the  Executive  Directors  of  the  World  Bank  and  the  governments  they 
represent. All errors and omissions remain entirely the responsibility of the authors. Both Mr. Kenc and Mr. Turhan 
are deputy governors at the central bank, and Mr. Yildirim is a senior specialist at the same institution. The authors 
may be contacted at turalay.kenc@tcmb.gov.tr, ibrahim.turhan@tcmb.gov.tr and onur.yildirim@tcmb.gov.tr. 
2 The regulation and supervision of the banking sector was divided between the treasury and the central bank. 3 
 
interest  rates. The savings  deposit  insurance scheme that was  introduced in  1994 to  avoid  a 
country-wide banking crisis was another distorting factor. While the government insurance was 
successful in preventing a bank run in the short term, it led to some moral hazard issues as some 
banks  offered  very  high  deposit  interest  rates  to  increase  their  market  shares,  leading  to 
unsustainably high overall deposit interest rates in the sector. Another problematic banking sector 
practice was the extension of credits by banks to companies that shared holding companies with 
them. This resulted from a lack of regulation and led to lower profitability and higher credit risk. 
In short, the banking sector in Turkey in 1990s was a sector that had a weak capital structure; was 
dominated  by  inefficient  public  banks;  had  significant  foreign  exchange,  interest  rate,  and 
liquidity risks; and lacked good corporate governance practices. 
The Banking Act No. 4389 of June 1999 was an important milestone in the regulation and 
supervision of the sector. Following this act, regulation and supervision were transferred to an 
independent authority, the Banking Regulation  and Supervision Agency (BRSA). The BRSA 
became completely operational in August 2000. Subsequently, tighter regulations were enforced 
on credits extended to group companies, on bank ownership and management criteria, and, last 
but not least, on exchange-rate risks. 
At  the  beginning  of  2000,  a  new  economic  program  based  on  a  crawling  pegged 
exchange-rate regime was initiated. Its main purpose was to bring down the very high inflation 
rates by controlling the exchange rates in a country with a high indexation behavior to exchange 
rates. A tight fiscal policy was initiated in support of the program. 
However, the exchange rates anticipated in the crawling pegged exchange rate regime, 
along with expectations for lower inflation and interest rates if the program succeeded, led some 
banks to take excessive foreign currency risks by increasing their liabilities from abroad while 
increasing  the  share  of  public  debt  instruments  in  their  assets  for  capital  gain  purposes.  In 
November 2000, one private bank could not meet its overnight obligations and tried to sell its 
holdings of government debt, putting a very high upward pressure on overnight rates and creating 
a negative environment for the public banks that also relied heavily on overnight borrowing, as 
mentioned earlier. That private bank could not meet its obligations, and its management was 
transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). 
Following  the  market  turbulence  in  November,  an  agreement  with  the  International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for an augmented program helped calm the markets, and the pressure on 
overnight rates diminished. The government announced a full coverage for all deposits and other 
obligations of banks. To encourage banks to be more prudent against credit risk, the provisions 
for credits were made eligible for tax deduction. 
As a result of the strong response, the November 2000 turbulence calmed, but a political 
crisis in February 2001, which led to concern that the government could not sustain the economic 
program, created the biggest financial crisis in Turkish history. Overnight rates increased up to 
almost 5,000 percent. The liquidity provided to the markets by the CBRT was used by the market 
participants to purchase foreign currency, creating a vicious circle, and the currency had to be left 
to floating. Turkish lira depreciated by more than 100 percent in a very short period of time, and 
the  treasury  borrowing  rates  increased  by  around  8  percentage  points.  The  full  coverage 
guaranteed by the SDIF following the November 2000 crisis prevented a bank run, but many 4 
 
private banks faced huge losses due to their open foreign currency positions. State banks that did 
not have that many foreign exchange (FX) open positions were safe in terms of foreign currency 
risk, but they were also badly affected due to their continuing need for overnight funding and the 
higher interest rates.  
Following the February 2001 crisis, the Program for Transition to a Strong Economy was 
initiated in May 2001, and the Turkish economy has experienced a notable improvement in a 
very short time, considering the scale of the crisis. The consumer price inflation rate, which was 
above 70 percent on average throughout the 1990s, declined to single-digit territory in 2004; the 
huge  budget  deficit-to-GDP  and  debt  stock-to-GDP  ratios  declined  to  levels  well  below  the 
Maastricht Criteria; and Turkey entered into a sustainable growth period, experiencing economic 
growth for 24 quarters in a row during from 2002 to 2007.  
An integral part of the Program for Transition to a Strong Economy was the Banking 
Sector Restructuring Program, which aimed to address the following objectives: 
1. Restructuring the public banks financially and operationally 
2. Resolving the status of banks that had been transferred to the SDIF  
3. Strengthening private banks 
4. Improving the supervisory and regulatory framework. 
Under  the  first  objective—financial  and  operational  restructuring  of  public  banks—
treasury bonds of around US$19 billion were transferred to state banks to cover their so-called 
duty losses, and these banks were operationally restructured. In only two years, more than 800 
branches of two state banks were closed and the number of their employees was cut by 30,000. 
Moreover, US$2.9 billion was transferred to these banks to bring their capital adequacy ratios 
above the minimum legal requirement of 8 percent.  
Under the second objective of the restructuring program, the status of the banks that were 
transferred to the SDIF was resolved by merging the viable ones with other banks, closing them, 
or privatizing them. 
Under the program’s third objective, a public support program was designed to strengthen 
the capital structures of the private banks. In a first step, the banks underwent a screening process 
in  which  the  capital  needs  to  bring  their  capital  adequacy  ratios  to  above  8  percent  were 
determined. In a second stage, the banks that could not find the necessary financing themselves 
were offered public resources by the SDIF, with the condition that the SDIF would have a seat on 
the management of the  bank. However,  all private banks  except  one provided the necessary 
financing  themselves;  the  management  of  exception  was  transferred  to  the  SDIF.  After 
normalization of the markets, the full coverage provided by the SDIF for deposits was turned into 
a deposit insurance scheme, with an upper limit of TL 50,000 (TL 50 billion before the six-zeros 
were dropped from Turkish lira).  
Despite  its  huge  cost,  estimated  at  around  US$50  billion,  the  Banking  Sector 
Restructuring Program has contributed much to the formation of a resilient and strong banking 5 
 
sector. Following the implementation of the program, Turkish banking sector reached a structure 
with  a  capital  adequacy  ratio  that  is  well  above  the  minimum  legal  requirement,
3  put good 
governance and risk management principles in place, and reached high and stable profitability 
ratios.  
In October 2005, a new Banking Law was passed by the   parliament, and the legal 
environment has been brought in line with the best international practices since then. Under the 
new Banking Law, the coordination between on-site and off-site supervisions was improved and 
important steps were taken for stricter criteria to be met by bank owners and management and for 
separating the responsibility  areas of the BRSA and the SDIF. Moreover, new limits and 
regulations were formed for credits extended to group companies by banks. 
As a result of the restructuring prog ram and the consolidation process, the number of 
banks in Turkey—79 in 2000—declined to 50 as of the end of 2007. These include four Special 
Financial Institutions that had interest-free banking activities.
4 The consolidation process resulted 
in a lower number of banks with stronger capital structures. The capital adequacy ratio, which 
was 9 percent in 2000, increased to 30 percent in 2003. In time, as the share of credits in total 
assets increased, the capital adequacy ratio of the sector declined due to the higher risk weight of 
credits compared to the public debt instruments that they replaced, for the most part, in bank 
balance  sheets.  Moreover,  the  inclusion  of  operational  risk  concept  in  capital  adequacy 
calculations in June 2007 also led to a lower ca pital adequacy ratio, which was around 19 
percent, still well above 8 percent.
5 
Turkish banks that used to play the main role in financing public deficits in 1990s due to 
very high real interest rates have turned back to banks’ traditional role of intermediation and 
financing households and the real sector, thus supporting economic growth. Since almost all 
types of credits have increased from a very low base by international comparisons, the high credit 
growth  rates  in  2002–07  were  widely  perceived  as  a  normalization  process.  The  credits-to-
deposits ratio, which stood at only 30.5 percent at the end of 2001, rose to 80 percent at the end 
of 2007. During the same period, the share of credits in total assets increased to 49.3 percent from 
only 20 percent. The sharp decline in credit interest rates, rising maturities offered by banks, 
increasing access to funds from abroad by banks and the decline in the borrowing needs of the 
Treasury  were  among  the  most  significant  supporting  factors  behind  the  credit  growth.  The 
CBRT monitored the credit growth closely in the pre-2008 period due to its impacts both on price 
stability and financial stability. The policy rate decisions of the CBRT in the inflation targeting 
framework have naturally been informed and affected by credit growth rate through its impact on 
the price stability and the auxiliary financial stability objectives of the Bank. In this regard, the 
policy  rate  of  the  Bank  may  be  viewed  as  a  macro-prudential  policy  tool  before  the  global 
financial crisis. The required reserve ratio was also used in this period although it was not used as 
actively  in  a  creative  and  unconventional  manner  as  it  has  been  used  recently  as  it  will  be 
                                                 
3 The international legal minimum requirement of 8 percent and the ―target ratio‖ of 12 percent  introduced by the 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency as a buffer in November 2006. Banks that fail to meet the target ratio 
are not allowed to open new branches.  
4 At the time of writing this paper (July 2011), the total number of banks is 48. Special Finance Institutions are now 
called Participation Banks. 
5 The capital adequacy ratio stood at 17.36 percent as of May 2011. 6 
 
mentioned in the second part. The CBRT has also affected credit growth by liquidity operations 
that increased or decreased the amount of funds which the banks may use in offering credits. 
Along with the increase in the share of credits in total assets, asset quality—proxied by 
the nonperforming loans (NPL) ratio—improved as well after 2001. The NPL ratio, as high as 
29.3 percent in 2001, declined steadily in the following years. The decline was supported by 
macroeconomic  improvement  as  well  as  large-scale  credit  restructuring  events,  such  as  the 
Istanbul Approach,
6 which allowed real sector companies that had problems paying their credit 
debt back to restructure their credits and extend their maturities. The NPL ratio declined to only 
3.5 percent as of the end of 2007 and stood at 3.04 percent as of May 2011. 
In addition to the improvement in the credit risk of the sector, banks became very prudent 
in terms of managing their foreign currency risks. The net foreign exchange position of the 
overall banking sector in Turkey has narrowly fluctuated around zero since the 2001 crisis. Banks 
have hedged their in-balance sheet open FX positions using off-balance sheet transactions. 
Another visible aspect of the change in the banking sector has been the surging foreign 
share. The positive developments mentioned above , coupled with the initiation of neg otiations 
between Turkey and the European Union, have led to a significant interest in the banking sector 
in Turkey by foreign banks , mainly beginning from 2005. Now more than half of the banks 
operating in Turkey are classified as foreign banks.  
The next section explains the macro-prudential steps taken by the CBRT (i) in response to 
the immediate impacts of the global financial crisis and (ii) in response to the widening current 
account deficit in Turkey and the financial risks associated with the  increasing deficit, with a 
strengthened emphasis on financial stability since the last quarter of 2010. 
The 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the Response by the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
This section focuses on the macro-prudential policies applied by the CBRT in response to 
the  global  financial  crisis  of  2008  in  three  phases:  (i)  full  liquidity  support  after  Lehman 
Brothers’ collapse (September 2008), (ii) the exit strategy (April 2010), and (iii) the new policy 
mix (late 2010).  
The Turkish economy contracted sharply in the initial phase of the recent global crisis, as 
was the case in almost all countries, but this contraction was followed by a very strong rebound 
in 2010 with an annual real GDP growth rate of 8.9 percent. The recovery in Turkey was the 
strongest within the European countries in 2010. The real GDP grew by 11 percent in the first 
quarter of 2011 compared to the GDP of the first quarter of 2010. It would be fair to say that the 
                                                 
6  The  Istanbul  Approach  was  a  voluntary  restructuring  agreement  between  creditors  (banks)  and  debtors.  The 
companies included in the approach were potentially viable ones with temporary illiquidity which led to problems in 
paying back their bank credits back. After due diligence by external experts and agreement by  majority of the 
creditors, restructuring agreements were signed between banks and these companies which allowed restructuring of 
their  credits  by  maturity  extension,  grace  period  for  principal  repayment,  debt  write-down  and  providing  new 
working  capital.  Through  the  Istanbul  Approach,  more  than  US$6  billion  of  real  sector  credit  to  banks  were 
restructured. 7 
 
CBRT had a significant role in alleviating the negative effects of the crisis on the economy so 
quickly and strongly. 
The CBRT took a series of measures to maintain economic and financial stability as a 
reaction to the global financial crisis that started in advanced economies. As the crisis led to the 
beginning of a recession in the last quarter of 2008, the CBRT started to cut its  policy rate. 
Between November 2008 and November 2009, 1025 bps was cut in total from 16.75 percent to 
6.50 percent in order to mitigate the adverse affects of the crisis on economic activity and to 
avoid  large  downward  deviations  from  the  inflation  target.  The  bank  also  took  measures  to 
provide  ample  liquidity  to  the  financial  sector  to  mitigate  the  potential  adverse  effects  of  a 
liquidity crunch in the money markets and to prevent excessive volatility in short-term interest 
rates.  The  measures  taken  for  Turkish  lira  and  FX  liquidity  for  smooth  operation  of  credit 
markets were as follows: 
Turkish Lira Markets 
1. In October–November 2008, the spread between the CBRT overnight lending and borrowing 
rates was decreased from 3.5 to 2.5 points. 
2. Starting  in  October  2008,  the  CBRT  began  to  provide  liquidity  more  than  needed  by  the 
market.  
3. CBRT resumed its repo auctions with three-month maturity as of June 2009. 
4. The  Turkish  lira  required-reserve  ratio  was  decreased  from  6  percent  to  5  percent  as  of 
October 2009.    
FX Markets 
1. FX buying auctions were suspended in October 2008. 
2. FX selling auctions were held. 
3. In October 2008, the CBRT restarted its intermediary activities in FX deposit markets.  
4. Transaction limits for banks were increased, and the maturity of FX deposits borrowed by 
banks was increased from one week to one month. 
5. The lending rate of 10 percent was reduced to 7 percent in US dollars and 9 percent in euros. 
6. In February 2009, the maturity of FX deposit transactions was raised from one month to three 
months and the CBRT lending rate was decreased to 5.5 percent in US dollars and 6.5 percent 
in euros. 
7. The FX required-reserve ratio was decreased from 11 percent to 9 percent as of December 
2008 and limits for export rediscount credits were raised. 
As  the  impact  of  the  crisis  on  financial  markets  eased,  the  bank  announced  its  Exit 
Strategy in April 2010, which aimed at the removal of excess liquidity (or overfunding) provided 8 
 
during the crisis. The purpose was to normalize the operational framework of monetary policy. 
As  a  result  of  the  favorable  developments  in  credit  markets  and  the  recovery  in  economic 
activity, the bank withdrew the temporary liquidity measures it had introduced during the crisis 
and raised required reserve ratios. The details of the Exit Strategy and the related Central Bank 
policies are as follows: 
•  Measures were taken for gradually reducing excessive Turkish lira and FX liquidity: Required 
reserve ratios for both TL and FX were raised. 
•  Remuneration of required reserves held at the Central Bank was halted. 
•  As a result of the cutback in the excess funding amount, the interest rate of one week repo 
auctions started to increase. Then, the second stage of the exit strategy was initiated, and the 
first step of the technical interest rate adjustment process was taken in May 2010. The one-
week repo rate became the new policy rate. 
•  An interest rate corridor (the difference between overnight lending and borrowing rates) was 
introduced for more effective liquidity management purposes. 
•  The intermediary function of the CBRT in the foreign exchange deposit market was abolished. 
(However, banks would still be allowed to borrow foreign exchange deposits from the CBRT 
within the predetermined borrowing limits. Nevertheless, the maturity of these transactions 
was decreased from three months to one week.)  
•  The  three-month  repo  auctions  were  terminated  with  the  consideration  that  the  liquidity 
shortage would diminish and the need for longer term funding would decrease due to the 
continuation of the CBRT’s foreign exchange purchases. 
In addition to the monetary policy exit strategy, the Central Bank accelerated reserve 
accumulation  to  contribute  to  financial  stability.  In  order  to  be  able  to  adapt  to  the  rapidly 
changing structure of capital flows, the bank also adopted a more flexible method for foreign 
exchange buying auctions from October 2010 onward. Moreover, the bank introduced further 
measures to direct the capital inflows driven by global monetary expansion to longer-maturity 
investments. 
It is widely accepted that a high current account deficit may threaten financial stability in 
case of a sudden stop or reversal of capital inflows. Turkey’s current account deficit has widened 
sharply on the back of continued revival in domestic demand and imports as well as higher 
energy prices as the recession was left behind and as the country resumed fast economic growth. 
The 12-month current account deficit had reached US$68.1 billion as of May 2011. It is worth 
noting  that  in  addition  to  the  role  of  credit  growth  in  fuelling  import  demand,  Turkey’s 
dependence on imported energy leaves it vulnerable to the volatility of global energy prices. A 
recent IMF report prepared for the G20 in July 2011 estimated that the current account deficit-to-
GDP ratio would reach 10.5 percent in Turkey at the end 2011.
7 Although the current account 
                                                 
7 Participants of the Expectations Survey (July 2011) of the CBRT expect the current account deficit to be US$68.1 
billion as of the end of 2011 (8.7 percent of estimated GDP for 2011 in the Medium-Term Programme) and US$62.5 9 
 
deficit might not be a problem itself, a high deficit-to-GDP ratio may leave countries vulnerable 
to sudden stops or capital inflow reversals in case of a general risk aversion sentiment in global 
financial  markets  triggered  by  an  event  even  outside  that  country.  This  was  one  of  the 
motivations behind the new policy applied since late 2010, which is explained in detail below. 
The monetary expansion decisions of the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, Bank of 
Japan and the European Central Bank in response to the recessions and weak economic activity 
increased the risk of a rising current account deficit through an increase in domestic demand for 
imported  goods  and  services  and  real  appreciation  of  Turkish  lira  caused  by  intense  capital 
inflows. The weak economic activity and the very low interest rates coupled with quantitative 
easing  and  huge  liquidity  injections  in  advanced  economies  combined  with  strong  growth 
prospects and high interest rate differentials in emerging economies led to a surge in capital 
inflows to emerging market economies, including Turkey. Higher credit growth rates supported 
by intense capital inflows in emerging markets may be a common aspect of financial deepening 
in emerging markets,
8 but it has also been observed in the past that credit growth rates beyond a 
certain point may be used as a leading indicator for  crises in balance of payments and banking. 
Hence, credit growth needs to be monitored closely and should be  addressed by countercyclical 
policies if a need arises.  
The main policy challenge here was the mixed outcomes of an increase in the policy rate. 
Such an action may reduce the current account deficit through the credit channel , on one hand, 
and increase the deficit through the exchange rate channel , on the other. The Central Bank’s 
innovative solution introduced in late 2010 was to prevent the acceleration in credit growth
9 by 
using  non-interest-rate  monetary  tools ,  such  as  increasing  reserve -requirement  ratios  and 
preventing the appreciation of Turkish lira by reducing the short-term interest rate, in a controlled 
manner. To prevent any confusion, it  should be underlined that the reduction in the policy rate 
takes inflation developments and the inflation targets into account in the two -pillar framework 
used. Put differently, using non-interest-rate monetary tools leads to a convergence between the 
policy rate needed for price stability and the policy rate needed for financial stability. Hence, it 
becomes easier to target both price stability and financial stability using a single policy rate. The 
benign inflation outlook has also allowed the CBRT to devote relatively more effort to financial 
stability since then. 
The approach just mentioned is supported by several other measures. One of the issues 
that the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) discussed in its December 2010 meeting was the 
maturity mismatch between the banking sector liabilities and assets. In this respect, the MPC 
suggested that it would be useful to differentiate reserve-requirement ratios for different Turkish 
lira deposit maturities in order to encourage longer -term funding, to raise  reserve-requirement 
ratios especially for short -term liabilities, and to widen the scope of reserve requirements. 
Another issue discussed by the MPC was the need to lengthen the maturity of capital inflows. 
Such a development would mean better quality financing of the current account deficit and better 
                                                                                                                                                              
billion as of the end of 2012, which correspond to much lower current account deficit-to-GDP ratios compared to 
IMF forecasts.  
8 The credits to GDP ratio was 25 percent as of end-2000, 34 percent as of end-2007 and 48 percent as of end-2010.  
9 The Bank explicitly stated that a 25 percent increase in credits in 2011 would be a suitable quantitative target in line 
with the financial stability objective of the Bank and added that it would take all necessary steps to reach this target 
by year-end. 10 
 
prospects for financial stability. Hence, the MPC decided to lower the policy rate and widened 
the corridor between overnight borrowing and lending rates to allow fluctuations in the short-
term interest rates when needed. 
In summary, a lower policy rate and a wider interest rate corridor, combined with higher 
required-reserve ratios, served as a more effective policy mix, contributing to both price stability 
and financial stability under the given conditions. These measures are also good illustrations of 
how a central bank may use its existing tools more actively in a creative manner. 
In more detail, the first pillar of the policy response was to reduce the incentives for carry 
trade and lengthen the maturity of capital inflows, which together aimed at improving the quality 
of capital accounts, limiting maturity mismatches, and avoiding exchange rate misalignments. 
To this end, the CBRT decreased overnight borrowing rates by a cumulative of 500 bps to 
1.50 percent, and reduced the policy rate by a total of 75 bps to 6.25 percent in December 2010 
and  January  2011  MPC  meetings.  Moreover,  the  corridor  between  overnight  borrowing  and 
lending rates has been widened, as mentioned, to introduce some volatility in the short-term 
interest rates and discourage short-term Turkish lira conversion through currency swaps. The 
unpredictable behavior of short-term rates, especially in swap markets, and the higher exchange 
rate uncertainty generated by the new policy framework, aimed at reducing the expected return-
to-risk ratios from carry trades and discouraging short-term speculative inflows.  
In  order  to  offset  the  potential  expansionary  impact  of  policy  rate  cuts  on  domestic 
absorption, the CBRT launched a quantitative tightening strategy, basically aiming at directly 
controlling the amount of liquidity and moderating the rapid credit expansion. As the slowing 
credit growth was seen as a key intermediate objective, as it would support both financial and 
price stability objectives, the CBRT started using reserve-requirement ratios as an unconventional 
policy tool.  
Next,  the  Central  Bank  started  increasing  reserve-requirement  ratios  significantly  for 
shorter  maturities,  while  implementing  comparatively  lower  ratios  for  longer  maturities.
10 
Coverage of liabilities subject to reserve requirements was also broadened. These decisions 
aimed  at  slowing  credit  growth  as  well  as  extending  the  maturity  of  the  banking  system’s 
liabilities, thereby reducing maturity mismatches. 
It is also obvious that central banks can be more successful if they are supported by 
related  institutions  in  the  economy  in  turbulent  times.  In  the  Turkish  case,  continued  fiscal 
discipline and tax hikes on certain  consumer loans  on the fiscal  side,  and measures  such as 
restrictions  on  credit  card  borrowing  and  loan  to  value  ratios  on  the  regulatory  side,  have 
contributed  much  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  monetary  policy.  In  this  context,  some  of  the 
                                                 
10 The Turkish lira required-reserve ratio (RRR)  was raised to 6 percent from 5 percent by 50bps increases in 
September  2010  and  November  2010  for  all  maturities  of  deposits.  The  ratios  were  differentiated  for  different 
maturities, beginning in December 2010 in four increments, including the last one in April 2011. Currently the RRR 
distribution for TL deposits is as follows: 16 percent for demand deposits and deposits up to 1 month, 13 percent for 
deposits up to 3 months, 9 percent for deposits up to 6 months, 6 percent for deposits up to 12 months, and 5 percent 
for deposits with one-year or longer maturity.  11 
 
significant measures that have been taken by the Council of Ministers and BRSA so far are as 
follows:   
1. Declaration of a  medium-term program  that underlines fiscal  discipline by the Council of 
Ministers    
2. Restricting the extension of FX-indexed loans to real persons in Turkey  
3. Increasing Resource Utilization Support Fund rates imposed on some consumer loans, leading 
to a rise in credit interest rates 
4. Introducing a 12-percent target capital adequacy ratio for banks  
5. Allowing banks to issue Turkish lira bonds within Turkey 
6. Setting an upper limit of 75 percent for the loan-to-value ratio in mortgages and of 50 percent 
for commercial real estate loans 
7. Increasing the minimum payment ratios for credit cards 
8. Increasing the provisions for consumer loans (except vehicle and housing loans) for banks that 
have a consumer credits-to-total credits ratio above 20 percent and for banks that have NPL 
ratios on consumer credits (except vehicle and housing loans) above 8 percent 
9. Differentiating  the  risk  weights  of  some  types  of  consumer  credits  in  capital  adequacy 
calculations using time to maturity 
Outcomes of the New Policy Mix 
The most significant outcomes of the new policy mix have been as follows: 
•  The net impact of the measures adopted within the new policy framework resulted in a tighter 
monetary policy stance, as evidenced by yield curves. Tighter domestic liquidity conditions 
driven  by  reserve-requirement  hikes  have  led  to  an  upward  shift  in  the  yield  curve  of 
government securities while also creating more volatility in the short end of the yield curve. 
•  The hikes in required-reserve ratios introduced since September 2010 have led to a withdrawal 
of around 10 percent of the total credit stock of liquidity from the banking system (annex 
figure 1). 
•  The volatility of overnight rates in the money market has increased markedly since the drastic 
cut in the CBRT borrowing rate in November 2010, which significantly widened the interest 
corridor in which the overnight rates fluctuate (annex figure 2).  
•  One of the goals of the new policy package was to increase the maturity of the liabilities of the 
banking system in order to support financial stability. The strategy of inducing more volatility 
for the short end of the yield curve has been instrumental in maturity extension in Turkish lira 
market operations. The average maturity of deposits also increased—the average maturity of 
Turkish lira deposits rose from around 45 days to around 60 days (annex figure 3). 12 
 
•  The share of Turkish lira swaps at longer maturities increased, while the share of short-term 
swaps declined significantly after the adoption of the new monetary policy.  
•  As the strategy to  discourage short-term carry trade has  been quite effective, there was  a 
significant drop in the stock of short-term speculative inflows, mainly through cross currency 
swaps, which can be tracked via off-balance sheet positions following the adoption of the new 
policy mix. 
•  Consequently, appreciation pressures reversed and the behavior of the Turkish lira diverged 
significantly from the currencies of peer emerging economies, which is estimated to have 
contributed to an improvement in the current account deficit (annex figure 4). 
Conclusions 
As indicated in the interest rate decision summary on July 21, 2011, due to the measures 
taken so far via the monetary policy, the domestic demand is now under control and the current 
account balance will start to improve in the final quarter of the year. According to the most recent 
credit growth data, as of July 15, 2011, annual credit growth was 35.7 percent,
11 which is still 
above the 25 percent target for the year  end, but it shows that there is a slowdown in  credit 
growth as desired by the CBRT (annex figure 5). Although the annual credit growth rate is still 
not at the target level, the acceleration in credit growth came to an end in the last few months. 
The tightening in credit supply conditions has continued in the second quarter of 201 1 thanks to 
the measures taken by the CBRT and the BRSA. There has been a significant increas e in credit 
interest rates recently. Hence credit growth is expected to decelerate in the second half of the year 
through the lagged effect of tightening in credit supply conditions. The credit growth rate in the 
first half of 2011 was around 17% and if th e credits grow by around 7% as a result of the 
expected significant deceleration, the target growth rate of 25% may be achieved. 
To sum up, the banking sector in Turkey became more and more resilient after 2001, with 
high capital adequacy, better managed risks, and high profitability. This outcome was one of the 
main reasons why Turkey left the global financial crisis of 2008 behind so quickly and strongly. 
Turkey had already experienced  its own financial crisis in 2001 and  had taken the necessary 
macroeconomic and regulatory steps to prevent another, while advanced economies accumulated 
financial risks and sovereign debt in the same period.  
The recent global financial crisis was a litmus test that differentiated countr y economies 
with sound and prudent economic policies from those with unsustainable monetary, financial, and 
fiscal practices. The Turkish economy, which is in the former group,  did suffer from the crisis, 
mainly due to the spillover effects  from the biggest economies of the world. However, Tu rkey 
was also one of the countries that left the negative effects of the crisis behind faster and  emerged 
stronger compared to both developed economies and many emerging market countries.  
   
                                                 
11 Although this figure is not much below the peak growth rate observed in total credits (36.5 percent), the 




Annex Figure 1. Reserve-requirement Balances Held at the CBRT (billion TL) 
 
Source: CBRT. 
Annex Figure 2. Volatility of Overnight Rates and the Widened Interest Rate Corridor 
 
Source: CBRT. 







































































































































































































































































































































































Annex Figure 3.  Average Maturity of TL Deposits (days) 
 
Source: CBRT. 
Annex Figure 4. Divergence of Turkish Lira 
 
Source: Bloomberg and CBRT. Emerging Markets: Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, South 
Africa, Indonesia, South Korea and Colombia. 





























































































































































































































Depreciation Announcement of QE2
by the FED15 
 
Annex Figure 5. Loan Growth (% change, yoy) 
 
Source: BRSA. 
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